(By Marco Cesario) (ANSAmed) - NAPLES, JULY 26 - "Naples and Paris: the two only capitals" is the maxim pronounced by Stendhal in 1817 with which writer and former director of the French Institute of Naples, Jean-Noel Schifano, summarised his latest work, 'Dictionnaire amoureux de Naples'. Published in France and recently presented at the Feltrinelli library of Naples, the 'Dictionnaire amoureux de Naples' is a passionate homage to the city of which he is honorary citizen, a text which presents, under the form of short historical-poetic descriptions, a gallery of personages and places connected to the city: Dumas, Flaubert, Gemito, Pulcinella, San Gennaro, Maradona. "Stendhal observed that in the middle of the 19th century Naples was one of the biggest metropolises together with Paris and London,"Schifano told ANSAmed. "Just think that, at that time, Rome had just 100,000 residents while Naples had 600,000. Naples was therefore the natural capital of a kingdom which lasted for six centuries, Rome became capital only because of a decision which came from above." Schifano speaks freely with his usual volcanic energy. He speaks of the glories of Naples, 'Italy's pearl', where the first railway in Italt was built (Naples-Portici), where Europés oldest theatre rises (San Carlo), royal residences which could compete for magnificence only with those of France (Royal Palace, Capodimonte). A city of which Madame Flaubert said: "A Mediterranean Paris. Such is Naples." Upon entering Naples from the Porta Capuana her husband Gustave was amazed: "As if I'm entering Paris", he wrote in his 'Travel Notes'. The city left a mark also Marquis de Sade: "The turmoil and the daily come and go made Naples a populated and fibrillating city like Paris," he said in 1776. Dumas described Naples 'the flower of paradise' and settled to live there "the last adventure of my life." But all that, the author describes in the text, ended with the unification of Italy. "With the unification the Savoy royals wanted to transform Naples in a provincial city, without success, but plundering it of its immense treasures. Not managing to govern it because it was insusceptible, even using the collaboration of the Camorra and local neighbourhood chiefs. Naples saw itself as deprived, in the years, from space and creativity. The Parthenopean genius took refuge in illegality," Schifano said. For Schifano, the banditry was not your average type, rather resistance against the forced colonisation of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies by Savoy's Piedmont. Schifanòs pen becomes sharper and more pungent as regards 'xenophobia'. Xenophobia is that 'historical' of the rest of Italy towards Naples because of its 'cultural potential' and its 'volcanic nature' and "is reflected in the editorials of journalists such as Giorgio Bocca or Giuseppe D'Avanzo, behind which there is a political will which intends to wipe out Naples' ancient history to make it the scapegoat of Italy's troubles." There is also a place for criticism of Roberto Saviano (author of the best seller 'Gomorra'), guilty of not having inserted his discourse "in a historical perspective, that is that of a city which "was degraded from its role of capital of a central government which did all it could to alienate it" forgetting that "Stendhal considered Naples the real capital of Italy and the only city in Europe which could be on the same level as Paris for history and culture." And he concludes with a cutting remark: "Naples has always made the rest of Italy be fearful, from the point of view of creativity, of culture. It is a hotbed of artists, geniuses, writers and brilliant politicians. Unlike Venice or Rome, whose historic centres have become mass tourism destinations, Naples' historic centre is still popular, a sign that this city remains always alive but most of all has never lost its deep identity."
The scope of this blog is to explain for the world what Neapolitan Independentism is.
Thursday, December 29, 2011
Saturday, December 17, 2011
Napolitano Holocaust - Addressed to U.S. Consule in Naples
Napolitano Holocaust
The emergencies that beset Naples have taken, over time, dramatic proportions. Those have been possible thanks to the connivance between the Camorra and the Italian State; a symbiosis, who was born at the dawn of the so-called unification of Italy, 1861. What is now known as the "liberation" of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies from the yoke of Bourbon was, in fact, a fierce war against the annexation of a free and sovereign state, for mere economic interests and international politics.
From that moment the nation Naples, the Neapolitans, stop to have a state that so interests, for a period which now amounts to 150 years.
It was also the moment where the Italian mafias institutionalized.
To date, the Neapolitan population is hostage to this plot the death between the Camorra and local institutions, and the central government, instead of fighting crime, institutionalized (look at the case of Nicola Cosentino) and enacts laws totally ineffective. The consequences of this cruel colonization, are under the eyes of all: in 150 years, Naples has gone from being a great world capital, to become a famous place only for mafia and garbage. It is no coincidence that the two "words" appear together in the same sentence. Behind the garbage in Naples and its degradation is politics. Behind the Camorra's policy. How to determine the Judiciary. On 25/11/2010 was issued by the GIP of Naples, the arrest warrant for Nicola Cosentino, a deputy of the People of Freedom, for collusion with the mob sindacate Camorra. Here are the statements of the anti-Mafia magistrate Raffaele Cantone:
"Without doubt the most interesting part of that decision concerns the role that Cosentino has been in the business waste; his intervention in the activities of the consortium CE4, so that, according to the repentant Vassallo, Cosentino said he would even" The consortium Caserta 4 me ". Based on what emerges from the order, Cosentino would also have a role in identifying the place to raise the incinerator in the province of Caserta. In that decision is then rebuilt another very important story: the creation of a super-consortium, called Impregeco, which would put together consortia of right and left, for a bipartisan emergency management, which had evidently ample blessings. The rubbish is politically colored and manage it as best you create a structure "rainbow" that please everyone.. "# More specifically, it motivation," contributed decisively to the planning and implementation of the project to create a cycle in the region Campania integrated and competitive alternative to the waste managed by the system legitimately Fibe - Fisia Italimpianti, so boycotting companies foster, in order to dominate the entire management of its business cycle and still create, directly controlling the landfills, waste disposal site at last and active in planning the construction and operation of an incinerator, exploiting an illegal managerial autonomy at the provincial level of government activities of the police station for the purpose waste emergency need. "Cosentino # - this is the belief of the judges of the DDA also shared by the magistrate Raffaele Piccirillo, who had signed the protective order, and subsequently by the Supreme Court and Review - have encouraged "the perpetuation of the dynamics of economic criminal, affecting inspection activities of the Committee access to the dissolution of the City of Mondragone for mafia infiltration and procedures for issuing certifications direct prefectural mafia, as in the cases related to the spa and related resolutions Ecoquattro final, decisive for sealing ducts and development of the program. "
Also according to the judiciary, most of the waste illegally dumped in landfills Neapolitan, came from companies in the north, in particular Lombardy, Veneto, Piedmont and Liguria. The Judiciary has acquired a sufficient number of "cards" to ensure that diesel fuel, chemical and hospital waste, and all sorts of special waste was spilled illegally for 20 years, under the nose of the Neapolitans, and almost all companies from the center and northern Italy, who paid and recorded those travels regularly to dispose of their waste in the economy. From this traffic we earned all: politicians, companies, banks, the Camorra. All but the unsuspecting citizens. But the documents speak for themselves on the map Contrada Pisani poisons from every corner of Italy, except from Naples itself. Below is an excerpt from a 2008 article by the journalist Conchita Sannino, because no one could explain the situation:
"According to early documents collected by prosecutors, in fact, in the western suburbs of forty dump Naples is not only the mountains of bags came from all over Italy, not only hazardous waste spilled, as authorities speculate parliamentary proceedings, in a subterranean and invisible - and then the second path is no longer verifiable. As of yesterday, instead sticking liability declined by name and geographical origin in the hunt for perpetrators of an alleged negligent disaster caused by the enormous quantity and quality of waste "inadequate" buried in the belly of the Plain. Just take a look at five pages of "official trips", and lawful, drawn from the archives of the Province of Naples in Piazza Matteotti and transmitted by the prosecutors who had made the request, the section coordinated by the deputy prosecutor Rosario Cantelmo, owner of the file, the prosecutor Stephanie Buda.
To scroll through the cards - although incomplete - held in the Province of Serbia, is that hundreds of thousands of tons of medical waste, special mud, asbestos dust, paint residues, expired or spoiled food are finished Contrada Pisani. An activity that would have been duly authorized by the provincial authorities in Naples, even if in violation of the rules protecting the environment in force since 1982. On this the prosecutor is investigating Buda, who recently ordered the seizure of the landfill, and yesterday received the data on the spill. Data for hours for the period 1987 to 1994. The magistrate, who initiated the investigation in cases of illness and deaths have occurred due to pollution of the area, assumed the offenses negligent environmental disaster and epidemics, and is also checking any administrative responsibilities. It should be made, however, a premise: all special or hazardous waste stored, treated, if the second rule, should be considered harmless. The possible lack of adequate reclamation of waste derived their charge so-called "toxic".
The list shows the companies and place of origin: Brindisi, various municipalities of Turin (Chivasso Robassomero, Orbassano), and Opera San Giuliano Milanese (Milan), Cuzzago of Premosello (Milan), Riva Parabbiago (Milan), plateau (Bologna), Parona (Pavia), Mendicino (Cosenza), St. Gregory (Reggio Calabria), and Rome.
Some data among others. In particular, in 1990, arriving 16 tons of waste from the acrylic adhesive of Sicaf Cuzzango of Premosello (Novara); same period, 21 tons of sludge purification plant Ferolmet of San Giuliano Milanese (Milan). Also riding in the late eighties and early nineties, Po is the paradise of special waste: 22 tons of paint sludge, resins and sludge coming from the province of Padua, 25 tons of special waste cosmetic expired Magic Touch of Rome ; another 50 tons of paint sludge from Sicaf of Premosello (Novara). And again, you end up buried 79 tons of industrial waste from Ferrara Robassomero Storage Centre (Turin), 113 tons of asbestos dust briquettes storage Ferrara Robassomero Centre (Turin), 552 tons of paint sludge Ferolmet St. Giuliano Milanese (Milan). And, finally, 1,106 tons of slag and ash from aluminum foundries Riva Parabbiago (Milan). The prosecutor is conducting a monitoring Buda at several public offices (local health authorities, hospitals, Inail, etc.) to verify the relationship between the occurrence of cancers and other diseases, and the situation of pollution. In the coming days, the judge will appoint consultants to various scientific investigations. It is possible that we draw samples of fabric from families of citizens of the tests for comparison with plain people in the area affected by incurable diseases. "
The Italian government does something about this? Promote the Camorra in the Northern League and allows MPs to decide the fate of the Neapolitans. An emergency waste, the Northern League # blocks the decree that would allow waste to be cleaned up in Naples in a few days, moving the garbage in other regions. It is also # news these days that the company has taken from Milan to Naples 50 million euros in taxes on waste (TARSU).
The Neapolitans, is more than obvious, is an internal colony to the Italian state. Therefore, the Front for the Liberation of the Neapolitans, # which aims to make itself independent of the Neapolitans by the Italian State, asking for a massive intervention in American organs Neapolitan territory. Italy has an interest in destroying one of the richest and most beautiful in the world. Nobody listens to us, even the EU. Only the United States, which have bases in Naples and a consulate, and a historical link with the Neapolitans, for the great influx of Neapolitan that the United States have accepted and which are now an integral part of reality 'U.S., we may be interested in .
Always Italian regimes that have occurred in these 150 years are the negatives of the fundamental rights of the people of Naples, so we ask that the right to 'self-determination is recognized Neapolitan people.
The U.S. ambassador in Italy, David Thorne addressed a greeting
The U.S. ambassador in Italy, David Thorne addressed a greeting to Naples and Neapolitans on the occasion of the 215th anniversary of U.S. Consulate in Naples.
That is the oldest embassy of U.S. in Italy, was founded in fact, 16 December 1796 in the Kingdom of Two Sicilies: Video
Maybe this document sent by FLN to the American Consulate is the reason of their care: Neapolitan Holocaust
That is the oldest embassy of U.S. in Italy, was founded in fact, 16 December 1796 in the Kingdom of Two Sicilies: Video
Maybe this document sent by FLN to the American Consulate is the reason of their care: Neapolitan Holocaust
Wednesday, November 30, 2011
The Failure Of The Liberal State 1876-1914 - Rufus Pollock
The Failure Of The Liberal State 1876-1914
Introduction
In 1861 Italy was united under a Piedmontese king, Victor Emmanuel II. The creation of a unified Italian State (completed with the acquisition of Venetia in 1866 and the Papal States in 1871) is often 'seen as the culmination of a series of developements stretching back to the first stirrings of nationalist sentiment in the the late 18th century'.1 Yet its creation occurred almost by accident and the Italy that was formed disappointed many of its makers. Cavour, Piedmontese Prime Minister, had only urged Victor Emmanuel to act for unification of all Italy when Garibaldi's success threatened to unite Italy outside of Piedmont's control and domination and on more radical terms than were acceptable. This meant that Italy was united in a rush with little consideration of the finer points of how this should happen; for example, whether Italy should be a single nation state or a federal body, monarchial or republican. As it was, Italy was united by force of Piedmontese arms and therefore Piedmont and the conservative Liberalism present there would dominate united Italy. This is what lies behind B.A. Haddock's assertion that 'from the very outset it [united Italy] was a hollow achievement.'2 The united Italy that was created was simply the 'Piedmontese state writ large', which to many nationalists, particularly the more radical was unacceptable. Piedmont had been allowed to triumph because, after the experience of 1848, most nationalists felt that constituitional and social issues should come second to the unification of Italy and its freeing from foreign domination. Many nationalists were disatisfied because political change had always been associated with social change and 'economic and cultural renewal' while the Piedmontese unification was essentially a conservative one 'designed to accomplish far reaching political changes while preserving the social status quo.'3
Not only did the unification, as it occurred under the control of a narrow Piedmontese elite, enjoy little support among the nationalists, but it also was opposed by the Church (particularly after 1870 when Rome was taken over by the Italian state). This was significant because the Church was much closer to the people at large than the political elite, and the Church's opposition to the new state meant it was deprived of an important popular legitmacy from the very outset. The Liberal political culture which dominated the new state further weakened its legitimacy and support by adopting wholesale Piedmontese law and administrative structures and even the Piedmontese constituition for the new Italy. For a country of such vastly differings regions all accustomed to different practices this was nothing short of disastrous. Coupled with the brutal suppression of civil unrest in the south in 1861-5 which was 'to sour relations between the north and south for generations to come'4 it is not difficult to see why some of the central 'themes [of] .. Italian history ... since the Risorgimento [have been] the incapacity of the elites to establish their hegemony over the classes that lay below them [in fact Italians in general], the weakness and inefficiency of the state ... [and] the enduring problem of the south.'5 It was the challenge to the Liberal state in this period to overcome all the handicaps with which it had been encumbered from the outset and to secure the support of Italians for Italy, to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the people for the Liberal state. In this it failed, why and how is what I will discuss in the rest of this essay.
Coercion and Conciliation: The Liberal State 1876-1900
It was only when Agnostino Depretis became Prime Minister in 1876 that the new Liberal State began in any great way to coerce or reconcile the various groups opposed to the united Italy that had been created. Up to this point government had been in the hands of the Right, landowning northern aristocrats, who had done little to gain legitimacy for the new state and little to make Italians greater than vague nationalistic sentiments of 'loving Italy'. The entrance of the Left, professional middlemen and politicians from the South, ushered in an era of low politics, where opposition was bought off, and that which couldn't be was coerced.
In some ways Depretis' 11 years in office were succesful. Large state spending particularly on the navy and railways helped to start Italy's industrialisation and created an economic boom. The creation of a national railway infrastructure would obviously be a massive boost for national unity in such a diverse and geographically divided country. And if Italy were to become a modern nation state it had to move away from an agriculture dominated economy to a modern industrial one. However there were several problems. First the industrialisation in this perod (1876-1887) further exacerbated the north-south divide with the south actually losing industry (e.g. the silk industry). Second the industrialisation failed to take off and in fact after 1887 the Italian economy entered its 'darkest years.' This reversal coupled with free trade, which had been terrible for landowners, led to the adoption of protection in a major way in 1887 which not only did great damage to the Italian economy in the short term but was a measure which favoured certain small interest groups against the population at large. Protection had in large part been demanded by landowners who were being hit by the Europe wide agricultural depression, and again Depretis only satisfied a small but politically powerful group. The peasants particularly in the south had actually suffered from unification through the combination of removal of large tariff barriers, the selling off of demesne land which simply resulted in the loss of communal grazing rights for the peasants, the imposition of large land taxes, and harsh suppression of any popular unrest. Thus in agricultural and industrial affairs Depretis' term did lead to new groups being attached to the regime (namely southern middlemen and the new industrialists) but it stored up problems for the future in other areas and did not gain support from several major areas of the populace.
In other areas Depretis did even less. Education was one of the major areas in which the new state could act to try and make Italians. Most Italians could not speak the Italian language let alone write it. Outside of Tuscany and Rome it is estimated only 0.6% of the population knew Italian and in the 1881 census 61.9% of the population was illiterate. Not only that, these figures disguise the fact that literacy was also a major dividing factor in Italy, with the north in general far more literate than the south. Considering this, one would have thought that the government of the 'Left' would have made a large effort in the area of education. It did little. In 1877 primary education was made compulsory but only for two years which was probably inadequate, and the time was only raised to three years in 1888. Moreover compulsion was a sham: in the south it is estimated that truancy ran at 80%. Despite the intention of the 'Liberal ruling class . . . to make Italians' through state run schools 'primary education enticed so few children into regular attendance that arguably it made little difference what was taught there.'6 The inabilility of most Italians to speak or read the national language was obviously a major impediment to 'making Italians' and gaining legitimacy for the national state. The fact that Depretis' government did so little about the problem is a major failure in any attempt to solve the problems facing the Liberal Italian state.
The other major failing of the Depretis government was that its method of gaining legitimacy (and perhaps the only one in the face of so many opposing forces) was to buy off opposition and politicise the state. The Liberal state felt it could not give too much power away to instituitions over which it did not have control. Thus the police were often used for political purposes (to harry opponents of government candidates at elections) and their powers 'were, at best, illiberal.'7 The judiciary was almost an entirely political instituition and it 'did not form an independent branch of the State. They [judges] could not protect themselves, let alone anyone else from political abuses.'8 The state's instituitions were corrupted into being political tools rather than backbones of a modern legitimate state, and the way these instituitions behaved could only further undermine support for it. Along with the distrust of local government by the central one and the large scale corruption on both local and national scales, and the narrow suffrage (widened in 1882 but still less 7% of the population) it is not surprising the government enjoyed little support from both the general populous and even some of the political classes.
The era of Depretis was the era of the integration of the southern deputies into the political system. Some other groups were also reconciled, for example some of the nationalists including Garibaldi, but many groups were not. With the extension of the vote in 1882, working men in the north could now vote and this would eventually mean the rise of a socialist party opposed to the Liberal state. Depretis failed also to reconcile the most important section of the opposition to the Italian state, namely the church. 'The 1880s were the classic era of trasformismo, i.e. of governments led by Depretis 'transforming' opponents into supporters'9 but it was usually only the support of a small elite and it was not permanent support. In the end the governments of Depretis did little to contribute to the 'legitimizing' of the Italian state, their most important legacy was the corruption of parliamentary rule. Though perhaps given the nature of unification it was inevitable, 'arguably it was better that governments should 'buy off' the Southern elites, rather than simply ignore them, or repress them. This was parliament's real function in the new united Italy: to make Piedmontese rule acceptable elsewhere.'10
Depretis had focused on buying off elites, but the period 1887-1890 saw the rise of popular organisations opposed to the Liberal state which could not be bought off without endangering the whole Liberal edifice. This was in no small part due to Francesco Crispi who became Prime Minister on Depretis' death in 1887. Crispi Prime Minister 1887-1891 and 1893-1896 was a crusader of the Liberal Right, determined 'to abolish corruption, strengthen the executive, reinforce the army, defend Italy's interests abroad and promote social reforms.' But Crispi with little concern for the complexity of Italy, 'succeeded mainly in disrupting the economy, endangering the whole Liberal regime, and provoking far more widespread and effective movements of political opposition.'11
One of the major problematical areas of this period was the economy. With the failing of the boom of the early 1880s the government came under pressure to impose tariffs. The two major groups who pushed for 'protection' were northern: 'it was essentially a North Italian alliance of textile manufacturers and Po valley landowners.'12 The protectionists got what they wanted and in 1887 a new general tariff was introduced. But this was only half the story, since the general tariff did not apply to countries which had a trade treaty with Italy. France, Italy's biggest trading partner, had a trade treaty but it expired in 1888. It was not renewed and in February of that year a trade war between Italy and France began, which was to prove disastrous for Italy. Not only was protectionism bad for the Italian economy but it had several other serious repercussions. The tariff war resulted in the removal of foreign investment from the country. This led to pressure on many banks which had overextended themselves in the earlier boom. Several banks failed and worse, as a result, the government allowed the six note-issuing banks, as a perk of bailing out smaller banks and finance houses, to print money. This resulted in 50 million lire of illegal currency being in circulation, but at the same time did little to save other banks. 'At the end of 1893 the two largest credit instituitions in Italy, the Banca Generale and the Societa Generale di Credito Mobilare, closed their doors. These banks had financed industry, agriculture, commerce and railways as well as property and their fall was an economic disaster.'13 Even the Banca Romana, a note issuing bank, collapsed at the end of 1893. This was not so serious economically as politically. Banco Romana had been in trouble since the late 1880s and had solved its financial problems by simply printing money. In 1889 a report had been commisioned by Crispi which strongly condemned the bank's practices, but the report was shelved because 'many of the bank's losses had been incurred from loans granted to tottering businesses favoured by the governments or politicians . . . [and] the Banca Romana, like other banks, had made large 'loans' to leading politicians, often without expecting any interest.'14 Eventually, though, Radicals managed to get hold of the report. The Banca Romana collapsed, and a new committee in November 1893 reported about the financial irregularities. More importantly the committee also named twenty-two deputies who had received 'loans' from the bank, including Giolitti, who at this point was Prime Minister. The Giolitti government resigned and Crispi, who had been let off by the committee, became prime Minister again. This was not all however. In December 1894 Giolitti handed over documents to the President of the Chamber which showed that not only had Crispi 'borrowed' money from the bank but so had his wife and relatives. Crispi did not resign but simply stalled. It was the defeat of the Italian army at Adowa by the Abyssinians (the first time a European army had been defeated by an African one), that finally brought Crispi down. The economic and colonial failures along with the domestic scandals of this period did not fatally weaken the Liberal state, but they continued to discredit it, particularly in their provocation of a more organised and vocal opposition. It is to the question of oppositon and the government's method of dealing with it that I now turn.
This period saw the rise two major opposition groups to the Liberal state, -the Socialists and the Catholics- the golden age of radicalism/Republicanism and also two major popular insurrections. From the very beginning the Church had been opposed to the Italian state and particularly the anti-clerical Liberal one, but in the 1890s the church increased substantially in secular society, this was due to two factors. First the Liberal opposition to the Church intensified under Crispi and his successors, and the reform of the charities in 1890 in particular 'made it even more vital for Catholics to gain or share control of local government'15. Second, the growth of Socialism was a profound threat to the Church, and one way for the Church to deal with it was to support its own social reform: 'Papal Socialism' was to combat 'Red Socialism'16 (Leo XIII famous encyclical: Rerum Novarum was published in 1891). This led to an increase in Catholic activity. For example a clerico-moderate alliance took over Milan in 1895, and 'this was the great era of the 'Opera' [dei Congressi, the most important Catholic lay organisation].' However the success of 'social Catholicism' led to problems. More and more Catholics felt an inevitable further step must be the relaxation of Pius IX's 'non expedit' which had prohibited Catholics from taking part in the parliamentary (state) elections, but this presented difficulties: 'As the '_Opera_' became more lay and more 'social', it seemed likely to evolve into some kind of a political party. Yet if it did that , would the clergy and the hierachy be able to retain control of it?' The success of the Catholic movement seemed also to threaten the Liberal regime. In 1897 di Rudini, the Prime Minister, decided to crack down, and Prefects were instructed to close down Catholic associations and journals. With the bread riots of 1898, and the participation of a small number of Catholics (e.g. Don Albertario) 'the whole Catholic network of social, educational, and economic bodies, so laboriously built up over the previous decades, was crushed.' Surprisingly the Church did not seem too distressed by the turn of events. In fact, 'the persecution of 1897-98 ....[led] to traditional 'intransigence' [being] quietly dropped'. The Church was scared by the radicalism of its own and felt it more prudent to defend itself by allying with the Right-wing Liberals, 'Catholic politics moved into an era of 'clerico-moderate' alliances at both national and local level; the Catholics threat had apparently been 'absorbed'.'17
The other threat to the Liberal state came from the opposite of the spectrum to the conservative Church, namely the Socialists and the Radicals. Socialism, particuliarly in a grassroots form of local labour organisations had already begun before this period (POI), but there were many different groups all committed to different aims and ideologies. It is only with the national labour congress in 1892 in Genoa that an Italian Socialist Party was formed. The main problem it encountered throughout the 1890s was periodic repression by the state. In 1893-4 there had been widespread disturbances in Sicily by Socialist led Fasci. The disturbances were harshly put down by Crispi, Fasci leaders were sentenced to long terms, all workers' associations were shut down, and Socialists were purged from the electoral roles. Moreover Crispi went further, in October 1894 he dissolved the Socialist party altogether, electoral roles were 'amended', and Socialist deputies were arrested. In 1897-8 it was again repressed by di Rudini, particularly after the widespread bread riots in 1898, and then by General Pelloux in 1899-1900. The result of all of this was to move the Socialists towards Radicals in demands for bourgeois liberties and reform as opposed to revolution, and despite all the government's efforts 'by 1898 the PSI was an important part of the coalition against the government.'18 While the Socialists represented the nascent populist party on the left, the Radicals while more significant in 1890s were on the way out. Nevertheless with the constant emphasis on the failings of the Liberal state and their fight for liberties the Radicals were significant, particularly in the way they influenced future leaders like Zanardelli. The Radicals were the intellectual opinion formers for the centre ground which included the left of the Liberals and the reformist right of the Socialists.
The 1890s had been an era of great turmoil for the Liberal state but what was the result? Strong government where parliament was disregarded and parties were banned with abandon was discredited. The elections of 1900 were a victory for the Left and the constituitional Liberals. At the same time many of the supposed subversive groups had been absorbed into the system - perhaps not altogether but now they were 'the defenders of liberty and the Constituition, against many 'conservative' groups.'19 However there was a flip side to this in that there were now groups of the Right (who had become particularly vocal in the constituitional crisis of 1899-1900) who were opposed to the state in the form it existed. It was out of this 'conservative' disaffection fertilised with the memory of Adowa that the nationalists, the greatest threat to the Liberal state, would spring. Essentially the 1890s had been period where the government had bullied because it could not bribe, and despite the seeming reconciliation of some groups, the Italian state as it existed commanded little if any legitimacy in the eyes of Italians.
The Age of Giolitti 1900-1914
Giolitti was the great conciliator of the Liberal state, he wished to conciliate opposition groups, to reconcile real Italy to legal Italy, but 'in the long run, his policies did not work.'20 Giolitti never resolved the fundamental problem of the Liberal state: that the Liberal elite was never willing to give up real power, and how was it to gain legitimacy if it did not. The people were to be ruled not taken seriously, Giolitti like all Liberals 'had no wish to see fundamental political change, and certainly did not intend to allow the Socialist, of the Radicals, or the Catholics, or the Nationalists, any autonomous role in Italian politics. These groups -or rather, their leaders - had to be bought off',21 not given equality within a democratic pluralistic system.
Giolitti was able to buy off so many groups in part because of the upturn in the Italian econcomy after 1896. Just as troubles in the 1890s had been associated with the depression after 1887 so the tranquility for the decade after 1900 is due in no small part to the improved economic conditions. Firstly the better state of the economy meant that employers were more willing to make concessions to workers, and in agriculture there would be no repetition of the bread riots of 1898. Secondly the state had more money, and for example could spend large amounts on relief for the South, 'designed to promote economic growth or at least buy off unrest.'22 In the North the state subsidized much of heavy industry, particularly indirectly through Navy contracts etc. Unfortunately in the long term none of this was very good. The South despite subsidies was left behind by the North, further increasing the already dangerous divide. Subsidies and interference in the North meant that in 'many leading sectors - steel, shipping, sugar - it was a handful of State-sponsored, tariff-protected, cartelized firms that succeeded; and they succeeded by virtue of their financial connections and their political weight.'23 In other words, major areas of the Italian economy were corrupt, inefficient and dependent on the state for their survival. All of this stored up trouble for the future (for example the steel industry now needed naval orders to survive and thus became a lobbyist for nationalist expansionism).
This was true of most other areas of Giolitti conciliation. He could reconcile groups temporarily with some titbit or other but could never permanently win their support. In fact often recconciling one group annoyed another one, 'Giolitti was a good political juggler but even he could not keep all the balls in the air at once.'24 Perhaps most significantly, Giolitti's conciliation throughout this period of the 'Left' eventually failed as worsening of economic conditions led to a hardening of line among Socialists, while at the same time alienating powerful groups on the Right (e.g. the landowners and industrialists.) Concession is also temporary, concessions lead to more concessions, and not only to the same groups, if one group gets concessions then all groups want them. Giolitti had other problems in that the period saw the rise of the nationalists, a group who could not be absorbed. The nationalists preying on Italians feeling of inferiority among the other European powers and memories of Adowa were extremely successful and with their tendency to right wing authoritarianism they presented a major threat to the Liberal state. With the widening of the suffrage in 1912 which meant the beginnings of a mass Catholic party the Liberal state seemed in dire straits. Giolitti was an extremely able politician but he solved none of the essential problems. In 1914 there was still no central constituitional (Liberal) party, and there were several parties which had little time for the Liberal state and despised democratic liberties. The end of Giolitti marked the end of the Liberal era - the Liberal state. After 1914 'most governments in Italy were either nationalist, or Catholic, or both'.25
Conclusion
This essay is entitled 'The Failure of the Liberal State'. By this I meant that the Italy formed after 1861 -the Liberal state - failed to gained legitmacy for itself, failed to reconcile legal Italy and 'real' Italy, and thus failed to ensure the its own survival. In 1914 the divide between North and South was, if anything, worse, with the South still a agricultural semi-feudal society while the North industrialized. In the 1911 census 37% of Italians were still illiterate, and the proportion was massively higher in the South than in the North, and in the countryside as opposed to the towns. Italy remained a divided country with little agreement among Italians on 'basic ideological, educational or social aims.'26 The Liberal state had bribed or bullied the people, never given them control. The country was still governed by a narrow elite with no legitimacy, which manipulated the people it despised. In the authoritarianism and failure of Liberal rule lay the rise of Fascism and modern Italy's crisis.
B.A. Haddock , 'Italy: independence and unification without power' in Themes In Modern European History, Ed. B. Waller (Routledge 1990). Pg. 92.↩
Ibid. Pg. 92.↩
Ibid. Pg. 93.↩
Ibid. Pg. 96.↩
P. Ginsborg, 'A History Of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics 1943-1988'. (Penguin 1990). Pg. 2.↩
Martin Clark, 'Modern Italy 1871-1982'. (Longman 1984). Pg. 38.↩
Ibid. Pg. 53.↩
Ibid. Pg. 54.↩
Ibid. Pg. 62.↩
Ibid. Pg. 66.↩
Ibid. Pg. 92.↩
Ibid. Pg. 94.↩
Ibid. Pg. 97.↩
Ibid. Pg. 98.↩
Ibid. Pg. 105.↩
Ibid. Pg. 106.↩
Ibid. Pg. 108.↩
Ibid. Pg. 112.↩
Ibid. Pg. 117.↩
Ibid. Pg. 137.↩
Ibid. Pg. 136.↩
Ibid. Pg. 131.↩
Ibid. Pg. 32.↩
Ibid. Pg. 157.↩
Ibid. Pg. 159.↩
Ibid. Pg. 177.↩
Introduction
In 1861 Italy was united under a Piedmontese king, Victor Emmanuel II. The creation of a unified Italian State (completed with the acquisition of Venetia in 1866 and the Papal States in 1871) is often 'seen as the culmination of a series of developements stretching back to the first stirrings of nationalist sentiment in the the late 18th century'.1 Yet its creation occurred almost by accident and the Italy that was formed disappointed many of its makers. Cavour, Piedmontese Prime Minister, had only urged Victor Emmanuel to act for unification of all Italy when Garibaldi's success threatened to unite Italy outside of Piedmont's control and domination and on more radical terms than were acceptable. This meant that Italy was united in a rush with little consideration of the finer points of how this should happen; for example, whether Italy should be a single nation state or a federal body, monarchial or republican. As it was, Italy was united by force of Piedmontese arms and therefore Piedmont and the conservative Liberalism present there would dominate united Italy. This is what lies behind B.A. Haddock's assertion that 'from the very outset it [united Italy] was a hollow achievement.'2 The united Italy that was created was simply the 'Piedmontese state writ large', which to many nationalists, particularly the more radical was unacceptable. Piedmont had been allowed to triumph because, after the experience of 1848, most nationalists felt that constituitional and social issues should come second to the unification of Italy and its freeing from foreign domination. Many nationalists were disatisfied because political change had always been associated with social change and 'economic and cultural renewal' while the Piedmontese unification was essentially a conservative one 'designed to accomplish far reaching political changes while preserving the social status quo.'3
Not only did the unification, as it occurred under the control of a narrow Piedmontese elite, enjoy little support among the nationalists, but it also was opposed by the Church (particularly after 1870 when Rome was taken over by the Italian state). This was significant because the Church was much closer to the people at large than the political elite, and the Church's opposition to the new state meant it was deprived of an important popular legitmacy from the very outset. The Liberal political culture which dominated the new state further weakened its legitimacy and support by adopting wholesale Piedmontese law and administrative structures and even the Piedmontese constituition for the new Italy. For a country of such vastly differings regions all accustomed to different practices this was nothing short of disastrous. Coupled with the brutal suppression of civil unrest in the south in 1861-5 which was 'to sour relations between the north and south for generations to come'4 it is not difficult to see why some of the central 'themes [of] .. Italian history ... since the Risorgimento [have been] the incapacity of the elites to establish their hegemony over the classes that lay below them [in fact Italians in general], the weakness and inefficiency of the state ... [and] the enduring problem of the south.'5 It was the challenge to the Liberal state in this period to overcome all the handicaps with which it had been encumbered from the outset and to secure the support of Italians for Italy, to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the people for the Liberal state. In this it failed, why and how is what I will discuss in the rest of this essay.
Coercion and Conciliation: The Liberal State 1876-1900
It was only when Agnostino Depretis became Prime Minister in 1876 that the new Liberal State began in any great way to coerce or reconcile the various groups opposed to the united Italy that had been created. Up to this point government had been in the hands of the Right, landowning northern aristocrats, who had done little to gain legitimacy for the new state and little to make Italians greater than vague nationalistic sentiments of 'loving Italy'. The entrance of the Left, professional middlemen and politicians from the South, ushered in an era of low politics, where opposition was bought off, and that which couldn't be was coerced.
In some ways Depretis' 11 years in office were succesful. Large state spending particularly on the navy and railways helped to start Italy's industrialisation and created an economic boom. The creation of a national railway infrastructure would obviously be a massive boost for national unity in such a diverse and geographically divided country. And if Italy were to become a modern nation state it had to move away from an agriculture dominated economy to a modern industrial one. However there were several problems. First the industrialisation in this perod (1876-1887) further exacerbated the north-south divide with the south actually losing industry (e.g. the silk industry). Second the industrialisation failed to take off and in fact after 1887 the Italian economy entered its 'darkest years.' This reversal coupled with free trade, which had been terrible for landowners, led to the adoption of protection in a major way in 1887 which not only did great damage to the Italian economy in the short term but was a measure which favoured certain small interest groups against the population at large. Protection had in large part been demanded by landowners who were being hit by the Europe wide agricultural depression, and again Depretis only satisfied a small but politically powerful group. The peasants particularly in the south had actually suffered from unification through the combination of removal of large tariff barriers, the selling off of demesne land which simply resulted in the loss of communal grazing rights for the peasants, the imposition of large land taxes, and harsh suppression of any popular unrest. Thus in agricultural and industrial affairs Depretis' term did lead to new groups being attached to the regime (namely southern middlemen and the new industrialists) but it stored up problems for the future in other areas and did not gain support from several major areas of the populace.
In other areas Depretis did even less. Education was one of the major areas in which the new state could act to try and make Italians. Most Italians could not speak the Italian language let alone write it. Outside of Tuscany and Rome it is estimated only 0.6% of the population knew Italian and in the 1881 census 61.9% of the population was illiterate. Not only that, these figures disguise the fact that literacy was also a major dividing factor in Italy, with the north in general far more literate than the south. Considering this, one would have thought that the government of the 'Left' would have made a large effort in the area of education. It did little. In 1877 primary education was made compulsory but only for two years which was probably inadequate, and the time was only raised to three years in 1888. Moreover compulsion was a sham: in the south it is estimated that truancy ran at 80%. Despite the intention of the 'Liberal ruling class . . . to make Italians' through state run schools 'primary education enticed so few children into regular attendance that arguably it made little difference what was taught there.'6 The inabilility of most Italians to speak or read the national language was obviously a major impediment to 'making Italians' and gaining legitimacy for the national state. The fact that Depretis' government did so little about the problem is a major failure in any attempt to solve the problems facing the Liberal Italian state.
The other major failing of the Depretis government was that its method of gaining legitimacy (and perhaps the only one in the face of so many opposing forces) was to buy off opposition and politicise the state. The Liberal state felt it could not give too much power away to instituitions over which it did not have control. Thus the police were often used for political purposes (to harry opponents of government candidates at elections) and their powers 'were, at best, illiberal.'7 The judiciary was almost an entirely political instituition and it 'did not form an independent branch of the State. They [judges] could not protect themselves, let alone anyone else from political abuses.'8 The state's instituitions were corrupted into being political tools rather than backbones of a modern legitimate state, and the way these instituitions behaved could only further undermine support for it. Along with the distrust of local government by the central one and the large scale corruption on both local and national scales, and the narrow suffrage (widened in 1882 but still less 7% of the population) it is not surprising the government enjoyed little support from both the general populous and even some of the political classes.
The era of Depretis was the era of the integration of the southern deputies into the political system. Some other groups were also reconciled, for example some of the nationalists including Garibaldi, but many groups were not. With the extension of the vote in 1882, working men in the north could now vote and this would eventually mean the rise of a socialist party opposed to the Liberal state. Depretis failed also to reconcile the most important section of the opposition to the Italian state, namely the church. 'The 1880s were the classic era of trasformismo, i.e. of governments led by Depretis 'transforming' opponents into supporters'9 but it was usually only the support of a small elite and it was not permanent support. In the end the governments of Depretis did little to contribute to the 'legitimizing' of the Italian state, their most important legacy was the corruption of parliamentary rule. Though perhaps given the nature of unification it was inevitable, 'arguably it was better that governments should 'buy off' the Southern elites, rather than simply ignore them, or repress them. This was parliament's real function in the new united Italy: to make Piedmontese rule acceptable elsewhere.'10
Depretis had focused on buying off elites, but the period 1887-1890 saw the rise of popular organisations opposed to the Liberal state which could not be bought off without endangering the whole Liberal edifice. This was in no small part due to Francesco Crispi who became Prime Minister on Depretis' death in 1887. Crispi Prime Minister 1887-1891 and 1893-1896 was a crusader of the Liberal Right, determined 'to abolish corruption, strengthen the executive, reinforce the army, defend Italy's interests abroad and promote social reforms.' But Crispi with little concern for the complexity of Italy, 'succeeded mainly in disrupting the economy, endangering the whole Liberal regime, and provoking far more widespread and effective movements of political opposition.'11
One of the major problematical areas of this period was the economy. With the failing of the boom of the early 1880s the government came under pressure to impose tariffs. The two major groups who pushed for 'protection' were northern: 'it was essentially a North Italian alliance of textile manufacturers and Po valley landowners.'12 The protectionists got what they wanted and in 1887 a new general tariff was introduced. But this was only half the story, since the general tariff did not apply to countries which had a trade treaty with Italy. France, Italy's biggest trading partner, had a trade treaty but it expired in 1888. It was not renewed and in February of that year a trade war between Italy and France began, which was to prove disastrous for Italy. Not only was protectionism bad for the Italian economy but it had several other serious repercussions. The tariff war resulted in the removal of foreign investment from the country. This led to pressure on many banks which had overextended themselves in the earlier boom. Several banks failed and worse, as a result, the government allowed the six note-issuing banks, as a perk of bailing out smaller banks and finance houses, to print money. This resulted in 50 million lire of illegal currency being in circulation, but at the same time did little to save other banks. 'At the end of 1893 the two largest credit instituitions in Italy, the Banca Generale and the Societa Generale di Credito Mobilare, closed their doors. These banks had financed industry, agriculture, commerce and railways as well as property and their fall was an economic disaster.'13 Even the Banca Romana, a note issuing bank, collapsed at the end of 1893. This was not so serious economically as politically. Banco Romana had been in trouble since the late 1880s and had solved its financial problems by simply printing money. In 1889 a report had been commisioned by Crispi which strongly condemned the bank's practices, but the report was shelved because 'many of the bank's losses had been incurred from loans granted to tottering businesses favoured by the governments or politicians . . . [and] the Banca Romana, like other banks, had made large 'loans' to leading politicians, often without expecting any interest.'14 Eventually, though, Radicals managed to get hold of the report. The Banca Romana collapsed, and a new committee in November 1893 reported about the financial irregularities. More importantly the committee also named twenty-two deputies who had received 'loans' from the bank, including Giolitti, who at this point was Prime Minister. The Giolitti government resigned and Crispi, who had been let off by the committee, became prime Minister again. This was not all however. In December 1894 Giolitti handed over documents to the President of the Chamber which showed that not only had Crispi 'borrowed' money from the bank but so had his wife and relatives. Crispi did not resign but simply stalled. It was the defeat of the Italian army at Adowa by the Abyssinians (the first time a European army had been defeated by an African one), that finally brought Crispi down. The economic and colonial failures along with the domestic scandals of this period did not fatally weaken the Liberal state, but they continued to discredit it, particularly in their provocation of a more organised and vocal opposition. It is to the question of oppositon and the government's method of dealing with it that I now turn.
This period saw the rise two major opposition groups to the Liberal state, -the Socialists and the Catholics- the golden age of radicalism/Republicanism and also two major popular insurrections. From the very beginning the Church had been opposed to the Italian state and particularly the anti-clerical Liberal one, but in the 1890s the church increased substantially in secular society, this was due to two factors. First the Liberal opposition to the Church intensified under Crispi and his successors, and the reform of the charities in 1890 in particular 'made it even more vital for Catholics to gain or share control of local government'15. Second, the growth of Socialism was a profound threat to the Church, and one way for the Church to deal with it was to support its own social reform: 'Papal Socialism' was to combat 'Red Socialism'16 (Leo XIII famous encyclical: Rerum Novarum was published in 1891). This led to an increase in Catholic activity. For example a clerico-moderate alliance took over Milan in 1895, and 'this was the great era of the 'Opera' [dei Congressi, the most important Catholic lay organisation].' However the success of 'social Catholicism' led to problems. More and more Catholics felt an inevitable further step must be the relaxation of Pius IX's 'non expedit' which had prohibited Catholics from taking part in the parliamentary (state) elections, but this presented difficulties: 'As the '_Opera_' became more lay and more 'social', it seemed likely to evolve into some kind of a political party. Yet if it did that , would the clergy and the hierachy be able to retain control of it?' The success of the Catholic movement seemed also to threaten the Liberal regime. In 1897 di Rudini, the Prime Minister, decided to crack down, and Prefects were instructed to close down Catholic associations and journals. With the bread riots of 1898, and the participation of a small number of Catholics (e.g. Don Albertario) 'the whole Catholic network of social, educational, and economic bodies, so laboriously built up over the previous decades, was crushed.' Surprisingly the Church did not seem too distressed by the turn of events. In fact, 'the persecution of 1897-98 ....[led] to traditional 'intransigence' [being] quietly dropped'. The Church was scared by the radicalism of its own and felt it more prudent to defend itself by allying with the Right-wing Liberals, 'Catholic politics moved into an era of 'clerico-moderate' alliances at both national and local level; the Catholics threat had apparently been 'absorbed'.'17
The other threat to the Liberal state came from the opposite of the spectrum to the conservative Church, namely the Socialists and the Radicals. Socialism, particuliarly in a grassroots form of local labour organisations had already begun before this period (POI), but there were many different groups all committed to different aims and ideologies. It is only with the national labour congress in 1892 in Genoa that an Italian Socialist Party was formed. The main problem it encountered throughout the 1890s was periodic repression by the state. In 1893-4 there had been widespread disturbances in Sicily by Socialist led Fasci. The disturbances were harshly put down by Crispi, Fasci leaders were sentenced to long terms, all workers' associations were shut down, and Socialists were purged from the electoral roles. Moreover Crispi went further, in October 1894 he dissolved the Socialist party altogether, electoral roles were 'amended', and Socialist deputies were arrested. In 1897-8 it was again repressed by di Rudini, particularly after the widespread bread riots in 1898, and then by General Pelloux in 1899-1900. The result of all of this was to move the Socialists towards Radicals in demands for bourgeois liberties and reform as opposed to revolution, and despite all the government's efforts 'by 1898 the PSI was an important part of the coalition against the government.'18 While the Socialists represented the nascent populist party on the left, the Radicals while more significant in 1890s were on the way out. Nevertheless with the constant emphasis on the failings of the Liberal state and their fight for liberties the Radicals were significant, particularly in the way they influenced future leaders like Zanardelli. The Radicals were the intellectual opinion formers for the centre ground which included the left of the Liberals and the reformist right of the Socialists.
The 1890s had been an era of great turmoil for the Liberal state but what was the result? Strong government where parliament was disregarded and parties were banned with abandon was discredited. The elections of 1900 were a victory for the Left and the constituitional Liberals. At the same time many of the supposed subversive groups had been absorbed into the system - perhaps not altogether but now they were 'the defenders of liberty and the Constituition, against many 'conservative' groups.'19 However there was a flip side to this in that there were now groups of the Right (who had become particularly vocal in the constituitional crisis of 1899-1900) who were opposed to the state in the form it existed. It was out of this 'conservative' disaffection fertilised with the memory of Adowa that the nationalists, the greatest threat to the Liberal state, would spring. Essentially the 1890s had been period where the government had bullied because it could not bribe, and despite the seeming reconciliation of some groups, the Italian state as it existed commanded little if any legitimacy in the eyes of Italians.
The Age of Giolitti 1900-1914
Giolitti was the great conciliator of the Liberal state, he wished to conciliate opposition groups, to reconcile real Italy to legal Italy, but 'in the long run, his policies did not work.'20 Giolitti never resolved the fundamental problem of the Liberal state: that the Liberal elite was never willing to give up real power, and how was it to gain legitimacy if it did not. The people were to be ruled not taken seriously, Giolitti like all Liberals 'had no wish to see fundamental political change, and certainly did not intend to allow the Socialist, of the Radicals, or the Catholics, or the Nationalists, any autonomous role in Italian politics. These groups -or rather, their leaders - had to be bought off',21 not given equality within a democratic pluralistic system.
Giolitti was able to buy off so many groups in part because of the upturn in the Italian econcomy after 1896. Just as troubles in the 1890s had been associated with the depression after 1887 so the tranquility for the decade after 1900 is due in no small part to the improved economic conditions. Firstly the better state of the economy meant that employers were more willing to make concessions to workers, and in agriculture there would be no repetition of the bread riots of 1898. Secondly the state had more money, and for example could spend large amounts on relief for the South, 'designed to promote economic growth or at least buy off unrest.'22 In the North the state subsidized much of heavy industry, particularly indirectly through Navy contracts etc. Unfortunately in the long term none of this was very good. The South despite subsidies was left behind by the North, further increasing the already dangerous divide. Subsidies and interference in the North meant that in 'many leading sectors - steel, shipping, sugar - it was a handful of State-sponsored, tariff-protected, cartelized firms that succeeded; and they succeeded by virtue of their financial connections and their political weight.'23 In other words, major areas of the Italian economy were corrupt, inefficient and dependent on the state for their survival. All of this stored up trouble for the future (for example the steel industry now needed naval orders to survive and thus became a lobbyist for nationalist expansionism).
This was true of most other areas of Giolitti conciliation. He could reconcile groups temporarily with some titbit or other but could never permanently win their support. In fact often recconciling one group annoyed another one, 'Giolitti was a good political juggler but even he could not keep all the balls in the air at once.'24 Perhaps most significantly, Giolitti's conciliation throughout this period of the 'Left' eventually failed as worsening of economic conditions led to a hardening of line among Socialists, while at the same time alienating powerful groups on the Right (e.g. the landowners and industrialists.) Concession is also temporary, concessions lead to more concessions, and not only to the same groups, if one group gets concessions then all groups want them. Giolitti had other problems in that the period saw the rise of the nationalists, a group who could not be absorbed. The nationalists preying on Italians feeling of inferiority among the other European powers and memories of Adowa were extremely successful and with their tendency to right wing authoritarianism they presented a major threat to the Liberal state. With the widening of the suffrage in 1912 which meant the beginnings of a mass Catholic party the Liberal state seemed in dire straits. Giolitti was an extremely able politician but he solved none of the essential problems. In 1914 there was still no central constituitional (Liberal) party, and there were several parties which had little time for the Liberal state and despised democratic liberties. The end of Giolitti marked the end of the Liberal era - the Liberal state. After 1914 'most governments in Italy were either nationalist, or Catholic, or both'.25
Conclusion
This essay is entitled 'The Failure of the Liberal State'. By this I meant that the Italy formed after 1861 -the Liberal state - failed to gained legitmacy for itself, failed to reconcile legal Italy and 'real' Italy, and thus failed to ensure the its own survival. In 1914 the divide between North and South was, if anything, worse, with the South still a agricultural semi-feudal society while the North industrialized. In the 1911 census 37% of Italians were still illiterate, and the proportion was massively higher in the South than in the North, and in the countryside as opposed to the towns. Italy remained a divided country with little agreement among Italians on 'basic ideological, educational or social aims.'26 The Liberal state had bribed or bullied the people, never given them control. The country was still governed by a narrow elite with no legitimacy, which manipulated the people it despised. In the authoritarianism and failure of Liberal rule lay the rise of Fascism and modern Italy's crisis.
B.A. Haddock , 'Italy: independence and unification without power' in Themes In Modern European History, Ed. B. Waller (Routledge 1990). Pg. 92.↩
Ibid. Pg. 92.↩
Ibid. Pg. 93.↩
Ibid. Pg. 96.↩
P. Ginsborg, 'A History Of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics 1943-1988'. (Penguin 1990). Pg. 2.↩
Martin Clark, 'Modern Italy 1871-1982'. (Longman 1984). Pg. 38.↩
Ibid. Pg. 53.↩
Ibid. Pg. 54.↩
Ibid. Pg. 62.↩
Ibid. Pg. 66.↩
Ibid. Pg. 92.↩
Ibid. Pg. 94.↩
Ibid. Pg. 97.↩
Ibid. Pg. 98.↩
Ibid. Pg. 105.↩
Ibid. Pg. 106.↩
Ibid. Pg. 108.↩
Ibid. Pg. 112.↩
Ibid. Pg. 117.↩
Ibid. Pg. 137.↩
Ibid. Pg. 136.↩
Ibid. Pg. 131.↩
Ibid. Pg. 32.↩
Ibid. Pg. 157.↩
Ibid. Pg. 159.↩
Ibid. Pg. 177.↩
Tuesday, November 22, 2011
Tuesday, November 15, 2011
Friday, November 4, 2011
Terroni: All That Has Been Done to Ensure That the Italians of the South Became "Southerners"
English publication of "Terroni" - A book about the Neapolitan genocide. In my opinion the english title and subtitle sounds horrendous, more horrendous than in italian, it should be "All That Has Been Done to Ensure That the Neapolitans and Sicilians became Southerns", but never mind.
This book can be "a spark that lights the fire" and awaken the old national pride of Neapolitan emigrants. When they discover that they have been cheated because of Italy's unification and the general history of Italian unification is a fake written by the winners.
In his book, Aprile explains, through a series of anecdotes and historical events, how Neapolitans and Sicilians has been robbed, how those people have been transformed to a poor and derided "minority". Napolitania's and Sicily's decline began with the unification of Italy, today resulting in an abyss in comparasion with the socio-economic development experience by northern Italian regions and the rest of Europe. Naples for 150 years ago, culturally and socio-economic development was at same level as Paris, just after London.
The book's title is a political statement. Aprile uses the word "terroni", which is a pejorative term used by North Italians to denigrate Neapolitans and Sicilians. Into the subtitle, Aprile uses the word "Meridionali", which translated means "southerners," and even that word is used by North Italians as a pejorative term, rather than in geographical mean.
Aprile relates events happened for 150 years ago to the present day in a skilful manner, he shows the similarity between the past and current events, or he shows causal connections between the events of the past and the present. He talks about how the government of Piedmont put up the first concentration camps in 1860, where thousands of Neapolitans soldiers loyal to the Kingdom of Two Sicilies was deported and left to die of cold and starvation, this happened about 80 years before the Nazi's infamous concentration camps in Europe. The similarities between the Nazis and the Piedmontese soldiers are reported by Aprile, when he describes how villages Pontelandolfo and Casalduni was destroyed by troops from the Bersaglieri, the infantry in August 1861, just as the Nazis destroyed the Marzabotto in September 1944. In both cases, civilians were massacred in response to attacks on occupation troops from irregular troops. Aprile also makes a comparison between the torture used by the U.S. military at Abu Graib with the Piedmontese were doing in the years after the unification of Italy. His comparisons between then and today's events, making it easier for the reader to immediately relate to the horrors that happened 150 years ago.
Aprile is based on an extensive amount of data from official government sources in Italy in order to demonstrate causal relationships between historical events and the current situation in Napolitania and Sicily.
One of the most surprising fact in this book is the value of the Treasury in the Kingdom of Two Sicilies, which was in excess of 443 million lire in gold, compared to just 20 million lira in paper money that the invading Kingdom of Sardinia had (as the Piedmont State was known as the unification of Italy ). The kingdom of Two Sicilies contributed with actually 60% of the total aggregate value of the new state of Italy, money that of course was brought to north, and was used to pay the debts of the Royal House of Savoy, the royal family that ruled the newly formed Kingdom of Italy, and who had been involved in wars against their neighbors for years. This money was used also unfairly to finance industrial development in Northern Italy.
Aprile remarks that money from the Kingdom of Two Sicilies, ironically, has been used to modernize northern Italy and to a small proportion has been allowed to rifle back to the South in the form of public aid and loans. In short, Neapolitans and Sicilians had ended up having to borrow their own money.
The book tells the story of pioneer industries in Napolitania, as the unification of Italy either shut down or run out of business due to a bias-driven competition from northern Italy, or as a result of specific political decisions of the newly formed Italian state. Metal Industries in Mongiana and Pietrarsa, shipyard of Castellammare, textile industry in Salerno, and sulfur mines in Sicily was the crown jewels before the unification of Italy and pretended to go over or reduced to second-class activities after the unification of Italy.
The most striking aspect of the book for a Neapolitan or Sicilian is that coincidence with the Italian unification withe mass immigration from southern Italy. The so-called "Questione Meridionale" was only a product of the invasion by Piedmont. Millions of Neapolitans and Sicilians left her occupied and impoverished countries to reach the shores of America, South America, Australia and other destinations.
Aprile says that immediately after the unification of Italy, Neapolitans and Sicilians realized that they were ripped off and revolted, by forming irregular armies, which came to be called "Briganti" of enemies from Piedmont. The book says that these soldiers' heroic resistance against an occupying power that sent 120,000 regular soldiers who fought in more than 10 years to quell the rebellion. The irregular troops were composed of former soldiers from the defeated Neapolitan Army, farmers and idealists who were unhappy over the Piedmontese occupation of their homeland.
Aprile is not particularly generous to the Italian national hero, Garibaldi, who made agreements with local criminals to conquest the Kingdom of Two Sicilies.
Aprile's book is a call to action for Neapolitans and Sicilians, with emphasis on theirs proud history, to take their courage to stay up and combat the prejudices and the injustices.
This book has been i bestseller in Italy, and now when it is translated into English, we hope that it will open the eyes of millions of Neapolitans and Sicilians spread beyond the sphere. It would make them understand why they were born in America, Canada, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Australia, etc.. They also will understand how heroic their ancestors were when they fought against a brutal occupying force, supported by Britain, France and other major powers who wanted to eradicate the Kingdom of Two Sicilies.
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